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exeCutive summary
While increasing attention is being paid to the drivers and forms of entrepreneurship in informal economies, much less of this policy 
and research focus is directed at understanding the links between mobility 
and informality. This report examines the current state of knowledge about 
this relationship with particular reference to three countries (Mozambique, 
South Africa and Zimbabwe) and four cities (Cape Town, Harare, Johan-
nesburg and Maputo), identifying major themes, knowledge gaps, research 
questions and policy implications. In many African cities, informal enter-
prises are operated by internal and international migrants. The extent and 
nature of mobile entrepreneurship and the opportunities and challenges 
confronting migrant entrepreneurs are under-researched in Africa in gen-
eral and Southern Africa in particular. Their contribution to the informal 
economy and employment generation in countries of destination and origin 
are similarly undervalued by policy-makers. Informal migrant entrepreneurs 
are often viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by citizens and officials. In 
part, this is because central and municipal governments see them as increas-
ing the growth of an informal sector that they want tamed, if not eradicated. 
Also, it is because they are often incorrectly seen as all “illegal immigrants” 
and, by definition, engaged in illicit activities. And, in countries with high 
levels of xenophobia such as South Africa, migrant-owned businesses are a 
visible and easy target for xenophobic attacks. Violent attacks on migrant 
entrepreneurs and their property have become extremely common in many 
South African cities.
South Africa’s relatively small informal sector is accompanied by very 
high unemployment levels. Many commentators therefore feel that the 
South African informal economy ought to be much larger than it is. Given 
the apartheid-era repression of informal entrepreneurship, the key question 
may not be why the informal economy is not larger, but why, after decades 
of repression, it is as large and important as it is. One of the reasons is 
that the informal economy is not just populated by South African citizens. 
Migrants from other African countries play an increasingly important role 
in the sector and experience considerable success, something that eludes 
many locally-owned start-ups. Informal retailing has been the major focus 
of economic research on different sub-sectors of the informal economy. 
Particularly common are small-area case studies of survivalist street trading 
(particularly of food and handicrafts) in the inner city. The spaza shop sec-
tor in low-income residential areas has also been studied. Other informal 
entrepreneurial activities that have attracted attention include the minibus 
taxi industry, waste collection and recycling, shebeens, trade in medicinal 
plants and poverty tourism. 
As well as documenting the economic challenges of informality, the 
existing literature on the South African informal economy raises two other 
Informal mIgrant EntrEprEnEurshIp and InclusIvE growth
 2
important issues that have a bearing on the environment for entrepreneur-
ship. The first is the relationship between formal and informal retail. The 
central research question is whether the rapid expansion of malls and 
supermarkets across the South African urban landscape, and their recent 
penetration of low-income areas, is having a negative impact on the infor-
mal economy. The second issue concerns the formalization of informal 
businesses, partially due to the ILO’s 2014-15 standard-setting process on 
“Formalizing the Informal Economy.” For reasons including greater legal 
control, collection of taxes and registration fees, enforcement of labour leg-
islation and identification and deportation of irregular migrants, the South 
African authorities would like to see the informal economy subject to formal 
rules and regulations. In South Africa, the drive towards formalization has 
progressed furthest in the taxi industry but many sectors of the informal 
economy remain outside the regulatory fold. Most informal entrepreneurs 
are opposed to formalization, stressing the financial costs and constraints on 
business flexibility.
The Zimbabwean experience raises important questions about the links 
between the collapse of the formal economy and the growth of informality. 
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s urban informal economy was small, 
absorbing about 10% of the labour force. By 2003, it accounted for over 
70% of the labour force and its contribution to gross national income (GNI) 
had grown to around 60%. In 2011, 84% of the workforce were in informal 
employment. The largest number were in retail and wholesale trade fol-
lowed by repair of motor vehicles and cycles, services and manufacturing. 
Women constituted 53% of those in informal employment. There have been 
few studies of the impact of state failure on the urban informal economy. 
Yet, under conditions of economic crisis, participation in more lucrative 
income-generating activities in the informal sector becomes essential and 
there are strong indications that the collapse of the economy actually had 
a positive impact on Zimbabweans’ entrepreneurial motivations and skills.
Mozambique represents a different scenario in terms of the links between 
informal entrepreneurship and formal economic growth. The Mozambican 
economy was virtually destroyed by the civil war in the 1980s and the vast 
majority of urban residents managed to survive through the informal econo-
my. In the last two decades, Mozambique has had one of the fastest-growing 
formal economies in Africa. Yet, the informal economy has proven to be 
extremely resilient. A 2005 survey concluded that 75% of the economically-
active population was employed informally in Mozambique. Another survey 
of Maputo found that 70% of the city’s households are involved in informal 
economic activities and about 65% of jobs are in the informal economy. 
Although research on the informal economy is not as extensive as in Zimba-
bwe or South African cities, several studies have highlighted the dynamism 
and heterogeneity of the sector and the role of informal entrepreneurship in 
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poverty reduction. The most common type of informal economic activity is 
the sale of foodstuffs and petty commodities. 
Mobility is essential to the urban informal economy in Southern African 
cities. Within urban areas, mobility is a vital component of the business 
strategies of informal operatives who identify spaces with niche markets or 
a relative absence of the formal sector. While some businesses operate from 
fixed sites, others use different parts of the city on different days or at dif-
ferent times of a single day. Many participants in the informal economy are 
internal or international migrants, often in competition with one another 
for the same market share. Although the numbers of international migrants 
are frequently exaggerated, it is clear that they have played an increasingly 
important role in the informal economies of Southern African cities over 
the last two decades and have reshaped the nature of informality and infor-
mal entrepreneurship in the region. Yet the importance of that role is often 
underestimated, invisible to researchers and denigrated by policy-makers.
Recent studies of migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa focus on 
several key issues: 
 0LJUDWLRQ KLVWRULHV DQG WKH GHPRJUDSKLF SURILOH RI PLJUDQW HQWUHSUH-
neurs; 
 7KHDFWLYLWLHVDQGEXVLQHVVVWUDWHJLHVRIPLJUDQWHQWUHSUHQHXUV
 7KH HWKQLF QHWZRUNV WKDW HQDEOH DFFHVV WR UHVRXUFHV VXFK DV EXVLQHVV
capital, cost-saving strategies such as shared shop spaces, revenue-
boosting strategies such as bulk buying, and material support such as 
accommodation for newly-arrived migrants; 
 7KHLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG[HQRSKRELDDQGURXWLQHFULPLQDOYLROHQFHWKDWDUH
a constant threat to migrant business activity; 
 7KH HQWUHSUHQHXULDO RULHQWDWLRQ DQG PRWLYDWLRQ RI PLJUDQW EXVLQHVV
owners; 
 7KH JHQGHUHG FKDUDFWHU RI PLJUDQW HQWUHSUHQHXULDO RSSRUWXQLW\ DQG
activity; and 
 7KHUHJXODWRU\IUDPHZRUNJRYHUQLQJLQIRUPDOLW\DQGPLJUDQWHQWUHSUH-
neurship. 
Migrants are often more entrepreneurial than most, yet the constraints 
they face in establishing and growing their businesses are considerable. 
Their general contribution to employment creation and inclusive growth 
is undervalued and often misrepresented as a threat. Foreign migrants in 
the South African informal economy do have considerable entrepreneurial 
ambition but are severely hampered in growing their enterprises by obstacles 
including:
 1DWLRQDO LPPLJUDWLRQDQGUHIXJHHSROLFLHVZKLFKGHWHUPLQH WKH WHUPV
and conditions of entry and the ability to move along migration corridors 
between countries; 
 'RFXPHQWDWLRQZKLFKGHWHUPLQHVWKHGHJUHHRIDFFHVVWRVRFLDOILQDQ-
cial and support services; 
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 ,PPLJUDWLRQODZHQIRUFHPHQWZLWKWKHHYHUSUHVHQWWKUHDWRIDUUHVWDQG
deportation disrupting business activity; 
 /DFN RI DFFHVV WR FUHGLW UHIXJHHV DQG DV\OXP VHHNHUV DUH FRPPRQO\
refused bank accounts and loans);
 0XQLFLSDO UHJXODWLRQV ZKLFK DUH JHQHUDOO\ XQIULHQGO\ WR WKH LQIRUPDO
sector, and hostile and xenophobic local attitudes. 
Violent attacks on the persons and properties of migrant business opera-
tions – whether motivated by rivalry, criminality or xenophobia or a combi-
nation of these – are regular and frequent and involve considerable loss of 
property and life. 
In terms of economic challenges confronting informal-sector entrepre-
neurs, both South African and migrant, a major issue is the lack of access 
to financial services including start-up capital and ongoing credit. Formal 
financial institutions are extremely reluctant to do business with migrant 
informal entrepreneurs. As a result, many rely on various financial boot-
strapping alternatives to minimize their capital outlay and running costs. 
Despite these financial challenges, there is evidence of upward mobility 
of migrant-owned businesses in terms of the growth of business capital. A 
central premise of the hostility towards foreign migrants in South Africa is 
that they “steal” jobs from South Africans. However, the studies reviewed 
in this report suggest the opposite. Migrant entrepreneurs certainly create 
employment opportunities for other migrants but they also hire many South 
Africans. More research is needed, however, on why migrant entrepreneurs 
employ South Africans and under what conditions. The essence of an 
inclusive-growth perspective on informality is that the sector should create 
“decent” jobs. Whether or not the jobs created deserve this label has yet to 
be established.
Among the most common manifestations of mobile informality in South-
ern Africa are the inter-urban linkages across international boundaries. 
When it comes to relations between South Africa, Mozambique and Zim-
babwe, most of this business is conducted by individuals travelling overland 
and engaged in so-called ICBT (informal cross-border trade). ICBT plays 
a vital, though largely unrecognized, role in regional economic integration 
and in linking informal economies in different SADC cities. Informal trad-
ers need to be seen as entrepreneurs and their activities as a potentially 
strong promoter of inclusive growth and employment creation across the 
region. In Mozambique and Zimbabwe, a sizeable number of informal entre-
preneurs are international migrants. They establish their businesses in their 
home cities, such as Maputo and Harare, and grow them by taking advan-
tage of the opportunities provided by cross-border economic linkages and 
migration. Informal cross-border traders, many of them women, thus play 
a critical role in the circulation of formally and informally produced goods 
throughout the SADC region. 
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A related aspect of the relationship between migration and informal 
entrepreneurship is the massive flow of cash remittances and goods that 
migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town send to Mozambique and Zimba-
bwe, including the cities of Maputo and Harare. The use of formal channels 
for remittance transfers is very limited in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. 
The business opportunities for small-scale entrepreneurs in the remittances 
industry are largely in the channels through which remittances of cash and 
goods are sent home by migrants. Informal transport operators called the 
Omalayisha move cash, people and consumer goods between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa, for example. 
Gender issues are of particular relevance in understanding the nature 
of informal enterprise in Southern African cities. Cross-border migration 
has always been highly gendered in the region. The feminization of migra-
tion is well under way with the numbers and proportion of female migrants 
to South Africa increasing rapidly. Unable to obtain work permits, many 
women are hired as irregular migrants, which heightens their vulnerability. 
Others are forced into survivalist activities in the urban informal economy. 
In both Harare and Maputo, gender-based tussles characterize the informal 
economy. The collapse of the formal economy pushed many more men into 
the sector and made the highly competitive informal business environment 
a site of new conflict. Cross-border trade between Zimbabwe, Mozambique 
and South Africa was initially dominated by women but high rates of 
unemployment amongst men have prompted them to move into the trade, 
leading to growing gender conflict over control of sectors of the trade and 
the proceeds of trade.
These gender-based issues can be reformulated as a set of key research 
questions: (a) does the feminization of migration impact on the nature of 
participation of women in the informal economy, are there gender differ-
ences in the types and opportunities for involvement of men and women 
in informal entrepreneurship and does small business development offer 
women (and especially women-headed households) a way out of urban 
poverty? (b) what kinds of challenges affect migrant female and not male 
entrepreneurs and what strategies do they adopt to establish and grow 
their businesses? (c) how do intra-household gender roles and expectations 
impact on the ability of women to establish and grow their informal enter-
prises? and (d) are national and local policies on migration and the informal 
economy disadvantageous to female entrepreneurs and what kinds of policy 
reforms would mitigate this situation?
Participation in the informal economy may be enforced, in the sense 
that there are no alternatives, but that does not mean that all participants 
are therefore just “getting by” until a better opportunity presents itself in 
the formal economy. One of the most vexing questions for small-business 
advocates in South Africa is what is commonly seen as an underdeveloped 
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entrepreneurial motivation or “spirit” amongst those living in more disad-
vantaged areas of the country. Some studies have contested this stereotype 
while others have sought explanations that are lodged in the repressive 
legacy of apartheid and the dysfunctional South African education system. 
The perception that migrants are far more successful entrepreneurs than 
South Africans in the informal economy has prompted a new research focus 
on migrant entrepreneurial orientation and motivation and favourable com-
parisons with South African entrepreneurs. Migrants tend to score better 
than South Africans on various indicators of entrepreneurial orientation 
including achievement, innovation, personal initiative and “competitive 
intelligence.”
The three countries (and four municipalities) discussed in this report 
represent contrasting policy responses to the informal economy and infor-
mal migrant entrepreneurship. The predominant attitude towards the 
informal economy in Zimbabwe over the last decade has been extremely 
negative and at odds with the reality of survival in a rapidly shrinking formal 
economy with mass unemployment. These views culminated in the nation-
wide assault on informality through Operation Murambatsvina (Clean Out 
the Trash) in 2005, which attempted to destroy all manifestations of urban 
informality: businesses, markets and shelter. Murambatsvina temporarily 
devastated the informal economy and the livelihoods of the urban poor in 
many Zimbabwean cities but informality quickly rebounded and returned to 
the urban spaces from which it had been erased. If Zimbabwe’s economic 
recovery continues, it is important to know whether the state will adopt a 
more tolerant approach to informality or whether the vast informal econ-
omy will continue to “fly under the radar” and be the target of repression.
In Mozambique, national and municipal authorities have traditionally 
adopted a tolerant approach to the informal economy. While it has been 
subject to periodic harassment, it is generally viewed within official circles 
as an important and sustainable source of livelihood for the urban poor. 
The policy aim is not to eliminate informality but to “discourage” illegal-
ity through registration and formalization. One mechanism has been the 
establishment of formal urban markets where vendors pay rent for stands. 
However, many of these stands remain unoccupied. In 2008, a simplified tax 
for small businesses was introduced, payable as a percentage of turnover or 
as a lump sum. However, uptake has been low. Informal entrepreneurs have 
been largely resistant to such efforts, which are viewed as a “money grab by 
the state.” There is some evidence that operators who have registered and 
paid licences and taxes are more productive than those who spend a great 
deal of effort evading the authorities, but the obstacles to formalization 
and why this might be avoided or resisted need further research, as do the 
implications of formalization. 
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The South African response to informality lies somewhere between the 
Mozambican and Zimbabwean, but has been neither consistent nor coher-
ent. At the national level, recent initiatives illustrate the kinds of anti-
foreign thinking that inform the national government’s policy response. 
The National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy was launched in 2013 
focusing on skills development, product improvement, technology sup-
port, equipment, and help with registration. The stated target of business 
upliftment is entrepreneurial activity in the informal economy. However, 
it also expresses clear anti-foreign sentiments. Another was the tabling in 
Parliament of the draconian Licensing of Businesses Bill in 2013. The Bill is 
extremely punitive and would result in large-scale criminalization of current 
informal activities. It also suggests that community-based organizations, 
non-governmental organizations and others will be given the job of working 
with the licensing authorities to police non-South African businesses. The 
xenophobic attacks of 2008 demonstrated that there are elements in many 
communities who need no encouragement to turn on their neighbours from 
other African countries. 
At the local level, in both Cape Town and Johannesburg, there are con-
tradictions between policy statements affirming the positive contribution 
of the informal economy and the actual implementation of policy. In late 
2013, the Johannesburg City Council violently removed and confiscated 
the inventory of an estimated 6,000 inner-city street traders, many of them 
migrants. The City has commissioned a project to consider alternatives to 
informality while simultaneously pursuing the declaration of large inner city 
areas restricted and prohibited trade zones. Recent research on inner-city 
Cape Town suggests that there is less violent but more systemic exclusion 
and there is evidence of ongoing harassment of traders throughout the city. 
Some of the most dedicated, enterprising and successful entrepreneurs in 
the South African informal economy are migrants to the country. Under any 
other circumstances they would probably be lauded by government as exam-
ples of successful small-scale micro-entrepreneurship. However, the state 
and many citizens view their activities as highly undesirable simply because 
of their national origins. Harassment, extortion and bribery of officialdom 
are some of the daily costs of doing business in South Africa. Many entre-
preneurs, especially in informal settlements and townships, face constant 
security threats and enjoy minimal protection from the police.
The Growing Informal Cities (GIC) project is examining and profil-
ing the “hidden” role of migrant informal entrepreneurship in different 
Southern African cities. The cities were chosen for analysis and compari-
son because they represent different forms of migrant entrepreneurship. In 
South African cities like Cape Town and Johannesburg, migrant entrepre-
neurs come from throughout Africa including Zimbabwe and Mozambique. 
In Maputo and Harare, most migrant entrepreneurs are local but they struc-
Informal mIgrant EntrEprEnEurshIp and InclusIvE growth
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ture their businesses around the opportunities afforded by growing regional 
integration and cross-border migration to and from South Africa. Policies 
towards informality and informal entrepreneurship vary from country to 
country. In Zimbabwe, the informal economy has been ruthlessly repressed 
but survives nonetheless. In Mozambique, there is a laissez-faire attitude 
towards the informal economy and attempts to formalize informal businesses 
through registration have not been particularly successful. In South Africa, 
informality is generally encouraged at the national level through training 
programmes and support activities. But at the municipal level, the informal 
economy is often viewed in negative terms and pathologized. The impacts 
of national and municipal programmes and actions are uncertain especially 
for migrant entrepreneurs. Indeed, these entrepreneurs, who could and do 
contribute to inclusive growth, are subjected to social and economic exclu-
sion which spills over into xenophobia.
The GIC project is generating a comparative body of knowledge about 
informal migrant entrepreneurs, raising their profile in regional, national 
and municipal policy debates with a view to effecting positive change in 
the regulatory environment in which they operate. By allowing migrant 
entrepreneurs to expand and reach their full potential, free of harassment 
and exclusion, a major contribution can be made to facilitating inclusive 
growth through informal entrepreneurship. To this end, GIC is advancing 
understanding of the reciprocal links between mobility and informal entre-
preneurship in Southern African cities through a programme of rigorous 
research oriented to the economic growth and poverty reduction goals of 
SADC governments, and impacting on policy implementation processes 
around migration, development and urban management.
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introduCtion
Cities in the South will absorb 95% of urban growth in the next two dec-ades and by 2030 will be home to almost 4 billion people (or 80% of the 
world’s urban population).1 Urban growth will be most intense in the cities 
of Asia and Africa. Over half of the population of the African continent 
will be living in urban areas by 2030 (or an estimated 750 million people). 
Southern Africa is one of the fastest-urbanizing regions in the world.2 The 
region currently has a population of approximately 210 million, at least 100 
million of whom live in urban and peri-urban areas. More than 60% of the 
population of two countries (Botswana and South Africa) is already urban-
ized.3 By mid-century, 11 countries are projected to have more urban than 
rural dwellers (Figure 1). More than half of the overall regional population 
already live in urban areas, a figure projected to rise to three-quarters by 
2050. With rapid urbanization and persistent urban poverty, urban develop-
ment challenges are set to intensify.4 
Figure 1: Current and Projected Urbanization in SADC Countries 
Source: Adapted from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs5
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Figure 2: Southern Africa Urban Population Growth, 1950-2050 
Source: Adapted from UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2014)6
The African city is characterized by high and expanding degrees of 
informality. Old dualistic conceptions of an economically and territorially 
bounded “informal sector” in which desperate people participate as a tem-
porary survival strategy until they can access the formal sector have given 
way to the reality that informality is the permanent condition for many new 
urbanites and is the defining feature of the landscape, politics and economy 
of the contemporary African city.7 As Simone has argued, “accelerated 
urbanization in Africa has produced cities whose formal physical, political 
and social infrastructures are largely unable to absorb, apprehend or utilize 
the needs, aspirations and resourcefulness of those who live within them. 
As a result, the efforts to secure livelihoods depend on largely informalized 
processes and a wide range of provisional and ephemeral institutions which 
cultivate specific orientations toward, knowledge of, and practices for, deal-
ing with urban life. Soon, the majority of Africans will live in peri-urban and 
informal settlements often at the physical, if not necessarily social, margins 
of the city.”8
The extent and importance of informality in African cities and to Afri-
can economies is subject to widely varying estimates. The Economic Com-
mission for Africa recently noted, for example, that “informal trade is as 
old as the informal economy. It is the main source of job creation in Africa, 
providing between 20 per cent and 75 per cent of total employment in most 
countries.”9 In most African cities, informality is the “main game in town.”10 
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Yet, as Potts notes, the lack of adequate data about informality “is scarcely 
surprising as one defining feature is that it is unregistered, and very loose 
treatment of the issue of ‘underemployment’ which often gets classified, 
erroneously, as unemployment.”11 The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and the research-policy network Women in Informal Employment: 
Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) have recently made considerable 
advances in generating country comparable and regional estimates of the 
size of the informal economy.12 Their data shows that informal employment 
comprises more than half of non-agricultural employment in most regions 
of the Global South – 82% in South Asia, 66% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
65% in East and Southeast Asia and 51% in Latin America.13 There is also 
significant variation between countries. For example, the proportion of non-
agricultural work in the informal sector ranges from 18% in South Africa to 
40% in Zimbabwe to 71% in Mali (Figure 3).
Figure 3: Employment in the Informal Sector in Selected African Countries  
(% of non-agricultural work) 
Source: ILO14
Although the individual incomes of informal workers are often low, 
cumulatively their activities contribute significantly to gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). The ILO has compiled data on the contribution of informal 
enterprises to national GDP in 16 Sub-Saharan countries and, on aver-
age, the informal economy contributed 41%.15 The proportion varied from 
58% in Ghana to 24% in Zambia. A more recent ILO publication provides 
evidence of the contribution of the informal economy to the GDP of a 
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smaller number of countries. It finds, for example, that in Benin, Niger and 
Togo, the informal economy contributes more than 50% of non-agricultural 
GDP.16 These figures show that the informal economy not only plays an 
important employment generation and poverty alleviation role, but is criti-
cal to local economies.
In many African cities, informal enterprises are operated by internal and 
international migrants. The extent and nature of mobile entrepreneurship 
and the opportunities and challenges confronting migrant entrepreneurs are 
under-researched in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular.17 
Their contribution to the informal economy and employment generation 
in countries of destination and origin are similarly undervalued by policy-
makers. Informal migrant entrepreneurs are often viewed with suspicion, if 
not outright hostility, by citizenries and officialdom. In part, this is because 
central and municipal governments see them as increasing the growth of 
an informal sector that they would rather see tamed or eradicated. Also, 
it is because they are often incorrectly viewed as “illegal migrants” and 
therefore, by definition, engaged in illicit activities. And, in countries with 
high levels of xenophobia such as South Africa, migrant-owned businesses 
are a very visible and easy target for xenophobic attacks.18 Violent attacks 
on the property and lives of migrant entrepreneurs have become extremely 
common in many South African cities – but are certainly not confined to 
South Africa.19
This report provides the backdrop for a new and systematic research 
agenda on migrant entrepreneurship in African cities. While increasing 
attention is being paid to the drivers and forms of entrepreneurship in infor-
mal economies, much less of this policy and research focus (with the pos-
sible exception of informal cross-border trade) is directed at understanding 
the links between mobility and informality. This report examines the current 
state of knowledge about this relationship with particular reference to three 
countries (Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe) and four major cities 
(Cape Town, Harare, Johannesburg and Maputo), identifying major themes, 
knowledge gaps, research questions and policy implications.
urbaniZation and informality
In Southern Africa, differences in the countries and cities of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique allow a comparative exploration of the links 
between the informal economy, entrepreneurship and inclusive growth. 
South Africa has the largest formal economy in the region but a relatively 
small informal sector. Statistics South Africa’s (SSA) 2014 April to June 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey recorded 2,379,000 people working in the 
informal sector.20 This constitutes only 16.5% of non-agricultural employ-
ment.21 The South African informal sector is dominated by wholesale and 
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retail trade (44%), community and social services (15%) and construction 
(15%). Unlike in many other developing countries, only a small group of 
people are involved in manufacturing (10%).22 Another unusual feature 
of the South African informal economy is its gender composition. In the 
majority of Sub-Saharan African countries, the percentage of women in the 
informal sector is much higher than men; however, in South Africa more 
men than women work in the informal sector.23 In Quarter 1 (2008), 46% of 
those reporting that they worked in the informal sector were women while 
by Quarter 4 (2014) this percentage was down to 40%, suggesting rapid 
change.24
South Africa’s small informal sector is accompanied by very high unem-
ployment levels. The latest available SSA figures recorded 5,154,000 people 
as unemployed, while a further 2,419,000 were recorded as “discouraged” 
job seekers.25 Combined, this constitutes 33.4% of the labour force.26 Many 
commentators therefore feel that the South African informal economy 
ought to be much larger. What is sometimes forgotten, however, is that 
until the 1990s the informal economy was viewed by apartheid policymak-
ers as “an ominous and unpleasant aberration (and) a blot on the urban 
landscape.” The overwhelming policy thrust was “towards repression of 
small-scale enterprises, seeking their excision from the urban landscape.”27 
Given this apartheid legacy and associated hostility towards informality, the 
key question may not be why the informal economy is not larger, but why, 
after decades of repression, it is as large and important as it is. That said, a 
body of research is emerging that looks at the barriers to self-employment in 
contemporary South African cities. These include crime, the risk of business 
failure, lack of start-up capital, high transport costs and social disincen-
tives.28
Data for the Quarterly Labour Force Survey is gathered in such a way 
that city-level statistics are unreliable. Disaggregation by province sug-
gests that the size and nature of the informal sector differs significantly. In 
the two most industrialized and urbanized provinces, the Western Cape 
and Gauteng, the informal sector is relatively small (at 11% and 14% of 
non-agricultural employment respectively).29 This contrasts with Limpopo 
where 32% of non-agricultural work is in the informal sector. The Gauteng 
City-Region Observatory’s Quality of Life Survey of 2013 interviewed a 
representative sample of residents and suggests a bigger informal sector 
in the region, however.30 Twenty-two percent of respondents who were 
employed worked in the informal sector and 27% of respondent households 
received some income from the informal sector. The main difficulty with 
employment figures, of course, is that they inevitably include both business 
owners and employees. The actual number of enterprises is more difficult 
to gauge, especially as business failure is high and turnover common.31 A 
panel survey of 300 informal businesses in Soweto, for example, found that 
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55% of those operating in 2007 had failed by 2010.32 In 2004, the Bureau for 
Market Research estimated that there were 748,700 informal outlets in the 
country including 261,000 hawkers, 127,600 spaza shops, 40,100 shebeens 
and 320,000 other types of businesses.33 
Informal retailing has been the major focus of economic research on dif-
ferent sub-sectors of the informal economy in both Johannesburg and Cape 
Town.34 Particularly common are small-area case studies of survivalist street 
trading (particularly of food and handicrafts) in the inner city.35 The spaza 
shop sector in low-income residential areas has also been increasingly stud-
ied.36 Other informal entrepreneurial activities that have attracted atten-
tion in Cape Town and Johannesburg include the minibus taxi industry,37 
waste collection and recycling,38 shebeen operation,39 trade in medicinal 
plants,40 poverty tourism41 and informal construction activity.42 Meth-
odologically, an interesting approach to understanding the complexity and 
dynamics of informal retail has been the use of GIS to map the spatial dis-
tribution of informal retail outlets and to relate this to other urban features 
such as the transportation infrastructure and the location of competitor 
formal retailers.43 
As well as documenting the economic challenges of informality, the lit-
erature on Cape Town and Johannesburg raises two other important issues, 
both of which have a bearing on the environment for entrepreneurship. The 
first is the relationship between formal and informal retail. The linkages 
between formal and informal enterprise are often overlooked in the conven-
tional dualistic model that undergirds much analysis of a functionally and 
spatially bounded informal sector.44 With regard to the issue of economic 
competition, the central research question is whether the rapid expansion 
of malls and supermarkets across the South African urban landscape, and 
their recent penetration of low-income areas, is having a negative impact 
on the informal economy.45 One study, for example, has argued that “one 
of the primary threats is the encroachment of supermarkets into areas tra-
ditionally occupied by the informal market. There is, for example, strong 
evidence that the informal sector is losing significant market share as a 
result of the encroachment of supermarkets into the territories occupied by 
the informal sector.”46 The study reports that between 2003 and 2005, spaza 
shop turnover in some areas was reduced by as much as 22% as a result. In 
contrast, a study of Tshwane argues that supermarkets have had a major 
impact on corner stores and greengrocers but that informal vendors are far 
more resilient.47 
Studies in Soweto have found that the impact varies with the type of 
informal business: although spazas and general dealers were negatively 
affected by the advent of malls, street traders were not.48 In nearby Ekurhu-
leni, however, formal retail dominates the informal food economy because 
the latter’s collective buying power is not being used in the same way as 
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large formal retailers of fruit and vegetables to obtain better terms of trade 
with suppliers.49 The African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) data 
for Cape Town and Johannesburg shows that the majority of poor urban 
households source food from both supermarkets (for staples in bulk on a 
monthly basis) and informal vendors (for street food and fresh produce 
several times a week).50 The possibility of corporate social responsibility pro-
grammes being directed to supporting informal entrepreneurs has recently 
been mooted. One study concludes that “business development support has 
a positive effect on lifting income and reducing poverty for microenterprise 
owners.”51
Formalization of informal businesses is the other issue that has become 
increasingly important in South Africa. This has been given greater profile 
in part due to the ILO’s 2014-15 standard-setting process on “Formalizing 
the Informal Economy.” For reasons including greater legal control, collec-
tion of taxes and registration fees, enforcement of labour legislation and 
identification and deportation of irregular migrants running businesses, 
the central, provincial and local South African authorities would all like 
to see the informal economy subject to formal rules and regulations. Many 
researchers see formalization as good for informal business since it would 
promote access to private finance and state-funded training programmes.52 
Chen does caution that “it is important to ensure that formalization offers 
the benefits and protections that come with being formal and does not sim-
ply impose the costs of becoming formal.” She also notes that formalization 
has different meanings and implications for different categories of informal 
workers.53 In South Africa, the drive towards formalization has progressed 
furthest in the taxi industry but many sectors of the informal economy 
remain outside the formal regulatory fold. Most informal entrepreneurs are 
opposed to formalization, stressing the financial costs and constraints on 
business flexibility. Attempts by the state to promote formalization in the liq-
uor sector have led, perhaps counterintuitively, to greater informalization.54
The Zimbabwean experience raises important questions about the links 
between the collapse of the formal economy and the growth of informality.55 
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe’s urban informal economy was small, 
absorbing about 10% of the labour force. By 2003, it accounted for over 
70% of the labour force and its contribution to GNI had grown to around 
60% – one of the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.56 In Harare, the informal 
economy rapidly expanded even as the formal economy shrank and rates of 
unemployment soared above 80%.57 In 2011, a ZimStat survey found that 
84% of the workforce were in informal employment. The largest number 
were in retail and wholesale trade followed by repair of motor vehicles and 
cycles, services and manufacturing. Women constituted 53% of those in 
informal employment.58 There have been few studies (in Zimbabwe and 
elsewhere) of the impact of state failure on the urban informal economy. 
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Yet, as Dube points out, under conditions of economic crisis and state fail-
ure there are “many business opportunities that may arise and being tied to 
an employer in the formal sector may preclude an entrepreneurial worker’s 
participation in more lucrative income generating activities in the informal 
sector.”59
There are strong indications that the collapse of the Zimbabwean econ-
omy actually impacted positively on the entrepreneurial motivations and 
skills of ordinary Zimbabweans.60 One case study has suggested that after 
2004 there was a major shift within the informal economy from household 
informal employment towards small enterprise development and employ-
ment.61 At the very least this points to the informal economy not as a site 
of desperation and last resort but a space of energy and innovation. As Dube 
concludes, “instead of treating the informal sector as an undifferentiated 
residual sector, there is a need for studies on informality in Zimbabwe that 
disaggregate this sector by sub-sector of activities and by locales – examin-
ing differences in activities, barriers to entry/exit and employment relation-
ships in the various sub-sectors and/or locales.”62
Mozambique, and Maputo in particular, represent a different context 
within which to explore the links between informal entrepreneurship and 
formal economic growth. The Mozambican economy was virtually destroyed 
by the civil war in the 1980s and the informal economy was how the vast 
majority of urban residents managed to survive.63 In the last two decades, 
however, Mozambique has had one of the fastest growing formal economies 
in Africa. Yet, the informal economy has proven to be extremely resilient. 
The Ministry of Planning and Development, for example, estimated that 
informal activity represented 41% of GDP in 2003 and 40% in 2004.64 A 
2005 national sample survey concluded that 75% of the economically active 
population was employed informally in Mozambique. Another survey of 
Maputo found that 70% of households were involved in informal economic 
activities and 64% of jobs were estimated to be in the informal economy. 
The involvement was significantly higher in female-headed households 
(86%) than male-headed households (62%).65
Although research on the informal economy in Maputo is not as exten-
sive as in Harare or South African cities such as Johannesburg, a number 
of studies have highlighted the dynamism and heterogeneity of the sector 
and the role of informal entrepreneurship in poverty reduction.66 The most 
common type of informal economic activity is the sale of products such as 
foodstuffs and petty commodities. Many are also involved in desenrascar 
(“finding a way out”), which involves everything from small-scale repairs to 
sex work and theft. The most profitable activities are hairdressing, the sale 
of second-hand clothes and traditional medicine. Other common informal 
activities include the sale of water, production of building material and fur-
niture, garbage picking, selling cell-phone airtime and the sale of charcoal 
and home-made brews.67 
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international miGration in southern afriCa
The end of apartheid brought a major reconfiguration of international migration flows in Southern Africa.68 Legal entries through South 
African land border posts and airports rose from less than 1 million in 1990 
to 6 million in 2000, and 15 million in 2014.69 These entrants (totalling 
nearly 130 million from 2000 to 2013) include tourists, visitors, migrant 
workers, immigrants, students, medical travellers, shoppers, investors, con-
ference delegates, diplomats, asylum-seekers and informal traders. Among 
the entrants are those who give one purpose for entry (for example, holi-
day) and then engage in other activities, such as working in the informal 
economy. The vast majority of those who enter do so on a temporary basis, 
although there is some discrepancy in official statistics between arrivals and 
departures each year (Figure 4). The departure figures are likely to be a seri-
ous underestimate as exits are not tracked as conscientiously as entries.70 
This clearly shows the problems associated with the exit data. At the Zim-
babwean border, for example, busloads of passengers are often simply waved 
through by South African immigration officials.71 However, arrivals data 
also includes many non-visitors.
Figure 4: South African Arrivals and Departures, 2000-2013
Source: Statistics South Africa72
Data collected by Statistics South Africa on foreign arrivals is split into 
two categories: non-visitors (e.g. temporary or permanent migrants, labour 
migrants, asylum seekers, students) and visitors (same-day visitors and tour-
ists). Of the 15,154,991 people who visited South Africa in 2013, 837,083 
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(5.5%) were non-visitors while 14,317,908 (94.5%) were visitors (Table 1). 
The visitors were made up of 4,781,340 same-day visitors and 9,536,568 
overnight visitors or tourists. The vast majority of the same-day visitors 
(98%) came by road from neighbouring SADC countries and 69% of the 
tourists also came from SADC countries, including Zimbabwe (20.3% of 
the total number of tourists), Lesotho (15.3%), Mozambique (11.7%), Swa-
ziland (8.8%) and Botswana (5.6%).
Table 1: Region of Origin of Visitors to South Africa, 2013
Number Percentage
Non-visitors 837,083 5.5
Visitors
14,317,908 94.5
Same day
Overseas 222,128 1.5
SADC 4,542,149 30.0
Other Africa 13,906 0.1
Unspecified 3,157 0.0
Total 4,781,340 31.5
Tourist
Overseas 2,660,631 17.6
SADC 6,618,866 43.7
Other Africa 237,186 1.6
Unspecified 19,885 0.1
Total 9,536,568 62.9
Total 15,154,991 100.0
Source: Statistics South Africa73
The precise numbers of international migrants living in South Africa are 
unknown, although the 2011 South African Census provides the best cur-
rent set of estimates. The Census recorded a total of 1.6 million non-citizens 
in the country, half of whom were in the province of Gauteng (Table 2). 
Table 2: Foreign Citizens Living in South Africa, 2011
Province No. of citizens No. of non-citizens % of non-citizens
Western Cape 5,650,462 180,815 3.2
Eastern Cape 6,437,586 57,938 0.9
Northern Cape 1,125,306 10,128 0.9
Free State 2,663,080 50,599 1.9
KwaZulu-Natal 10,113,978 111,254 1.1
North West 3,439,700 120,390 3.5
Gauteng 11,952,392 848,620 7.1
Mpumalanga 3,983,570 103,573 2.6
Limpopo 5,322,134 138,375 2.6
Total 50,688,208 1,621,692 3.2
Source: Statistics South Africa74
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The South African migrant stock (those born outside the country) was 
dominated by Zimbabweans (a total of 515,000 adults between the ages of 15 
and 64) (Table 3). Other countries with 70,000 migrants or more in South 
Africa include Mozambique, Lesotho and Malawi. The only non-African 
country in the top 10 is India (at 24,000). Many migrant entrepreneurs 
in South Africa entered the country as asylum-seekers and later obtained 
refugee status. The number of asylum applications rose dramatically from 
around 16,000 in 1996 to a peak of about 220,000 in 2009, primarily as a 
result of claims submitted by Zimbabweans (Figure 5).
Table 3: Foreign Migrants Living in South Africa by Country of Birth and Employment Status
Total Employment rate (%)
Unemployment 
rate (%)
Labour force  
participation rate (%)
Zimbabwe 515,824 66 18 80
Mozambique 262,556 58 24 76
Lesotho 124,463 51 30 73
Malawi 69,544 72 14 84
Namibia 29,653 67 10 74
Swaziland 27,471 52 22 67
India 23,780 64 6 68
Zambia 22,833 70 9 76
Nigeria 20,983 69 13 79
Congo 18,545 52 24 68
Source: Budlender75
 
Figure 5: Applications for Refugee Status in South Africa, 1996-2012
Source: UNHCR Statistical Yearbook (Various Reports)
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Migration to South Africa has been the dominant form of movement 
from post-colonial Zimbabwe, especially for the semi-skilled and unskilled.76 
Movement from Zimbabwe to South Africa has grown rapidly in recent dec-
ades (Figure 6). The number of Zimbabweans entering South Africa legally 
and temporarily for various reasons rose from 255,988 in 1990 to 477,380 
in 2000 and to 1,847,973 in 2012. In 2012, the majority of Zimbabweans 
(97%) indicated holiday as their purpose of entry while other categories 
included transit (1.5%), business (1%) and study (0.6 %). Many “holiday 
makers” from Zimbabwe are known to engage in a wide variety of income-
generating activities in South Africa, particularly informal trade. 
Figure 6: Legal Entries of Zimbabweans into South Africa, 1980-2012
Source: Statistics South Africa, Various reports
In 2001, the South African Census recorded 130,090 Zimbabwe-born 
people in the country (a figure that included 54,294 whites who had left 
Zimbabwe after independence in 1980). Only a decade later, the 2011 
Census counted a total of 515,824 Zimbabweans aged between 15 and 64 in 
South Africa.77 This increase occurred despite a major campaign to deport 
Zimbabweans, which saw the number of deportees rise from 43,000 in 1999 
(or 23% of total deportations) to 205,000 in 2007 (or two-thirds of the 
total) (Table 4). In total, between 2000 and 2008, nearly 600,000 Zimba-
bweans were deported from South Africa.
Zimbabwean migrants responded to the mass deportations by applying in 
large numbers for refugee status in South Africa, which would protect them 
from deportation. The number of refugee claimants rose from just four in 
2001 to 149,453 in 2009 (Figure 7). Holders of renewable asylum-seeker 
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permits were allowed to remain legally in South Africa until their claims 
were adjudicated. The mounting pressures on the refugee determination 
system and the costly failure of the deportation campaign led the South 
African government to introduce a moratorium on deportations that lasted 
from 2009 to 2012. It also implemented an “immigration amnesty” for Zim-
babweans in 2010.78 By the time the amnesty ended in mid-2011, a total 
of 242,371 Zimbabweans had been granted four-year residence permits in 
South Africa. In August 2014, the South African government introduced a 
new programme extending these permits by a further three years. 
Table 4: Deportations of Zimbabweans from South Africa, 1999-2008
Deportations
Total deportees Zimbabwean deportees Zimbabwean deportees as % of total
1999 183,861 42,769 23.3
2000 145,575 45,922 31.5
2001 156,123 47,697 30.6
2002 135,870 38,118 28.1
2003 164,808 55,753 33.8
2004 167,137 72,112 43.1
2005 209,988 97,433 46.4
2006 266,067 109,532 41.2
2007 312,733 204,827 65.5
2008 280,837 164,678 58.6
Source: Department of Home Affairs (South Africa) Annual Reports
A 2010 SAMP survey of working-age Zimbabweans in two South Afri-
can cities (Cape Town and Johannesburg) prior to the amnesty found that 
52% held asylum-seeker permits, 19% held work permits and only 2% had 
acquired permanent residence.79 Until recently, most migrants from Zim-
babwe engaged in circular migration, spending only short periods in South 
Africa, returning home frequently and showing little inclination to remain 
in South Africa. The 2010 SAMP survey was limited to migrants who had 
gone to South Africa for the first time between 2005 and 2010 and painted 
a very different picture. South Africa is increasingly seen as a longer-term 
destination rather than a temporary place to earn quick money. Nearly half 
of the respondents said that they wanted to remain in South Africa “for 
a few years” and another 21% that they wanted to remain indefinitely or 
permanently. In other words, two-thirds of recent migrants viewed a long-
term stay in South Africa as desirable and many are bringing their families 
with them.
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Figure 7: Asylum Applications by Zimbabweans in South Africa, 2001-2010
Source: UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database
Post-apartheid migration patterns between Mozambique and South 
Africa have a rather different history. The dominant form of movement 
between the two countries for most of the twentieth century was contract 
migration to the South African mines, predominantly from rural areas of 
Mozambique.80 In the 1980s, however, the civil war in Mozambique led 
to a major influx of asylum-seekers, estimated to be anywhere between 
300,000 and 400,000 people. Most settled along the border between the two 
countries and were integrated into local communities and worked on local 
farms.81 Those who migrated to the cities tended to work in the informal 
economy although many were arrested and deported, with the number of 
deportations peaking at 156,000 in 1996 (Table 5). In 2000, an immigra-
tion amnesty gave South African residency status to an estimated 110,000 
former refugees and the number of deportations immediately fell by 50%.82 
After 2004, and the abandonment of visa restrictions on Mozambicans, 
cross-border traffic increased from around 400,000 documented entries per 
annum to nearly 1.8 million in 2013 (Figure 8). As with Zimbabweans, the 
Mozambicans comprised a wide variety of migrants with different reasons 
for entry. And as with Zimbabweans, many of the migrants overstayed as 
“undocumented migrants” where they did menial jobs and worked in the 
informal economy.83 However, one of the primary motivators was cross-
border informal trade between Maputo and South African border towns as 
well as cities such as Johannesburg. 
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Table 5: Deportation of Mozambicans from South Africa, 1990-2004
Deportations
Total deportees Mozambican deportees
Mozambican deportees as 
% of total
1990 53,418 42,330 79.2
1991 61,345 47,074 76.7
1992 82,575 61,210 74.1
1993 96,600 80,926 83.8
1994 90,692 74,279 81.9
1995 157,084 131,689 83.8
1996 180,713 157,425 87.1
1997 176,351 146,285 83.0
1998 181,286 141,506 78.1
1999 183,861 123,961 67.4
2000 145,575 84,738 58.2
2001 156,123 94,404 60.5
2002 151,653 83,695 55.2
2003 164,808 82,067 49.8
2004 167,137 81,619 48.8
Note: Deportation figures for Mozambique are available only up to 2004
Source: Department of Home Affairs (South Africa) Annual Reports
Figure 8: Legal Entries of Mozambicans into South Africa, 1999-2013
Source: Statistics South Africa, Various Reports
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miGrants and the informal eConomy
Mobility is essential to the operation and dynamism of the urban infor-mal economy in Southern African cities. Within urban areas, mobility 
is a vital component of the business strategies of informal operatives who 
identify spaces with niche markets or a relative absence of the formal sector. 
While some businesses operate from fixed sites others are extremely mobile, 
operating in different parts of the city on different days or at different times 
of a single day. Many of the participants in the informal economy are inter-
nal or international migrants, often in competition with one another for 
the same market share. Although the numbers of international migrants 
are frequently exaggerated, it is clear that they have played an increasingly 
important role in the informal economies of Southern African cities over 
the last two decades and have reshaped the nature of informality and infor-
mal entrepreneurship in the region. Yet the importance of that role is often 
underestimated, invisible to researchers and denigrated by policy-makers.84
The emerging literature on migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa 
focuses on several issues: 
 0LJUDWLRQ KLVWRULHV DQG WKH GHPRJUDSKLF SURILOH RI PLJUDQW HQWUHSUH-
neurs;85 
 7KHDFWLYLWLHVDQGEXVLQHVVVWUDWHJLHVRIPLJUDQWHQWUHSUHQHXUV86 
 7KH HWKQLF QHWZRUNV WKDW HQDEOH DFFHVV WR UHVRXUFHV VXFK DV EXVLQHVV
capital, cost-saving strategies such as shared shop spaces, revenue-
boosting strategies such as bulk buying, and material support such as 
accommodation for newly-arrived migrants;87 and
 7KHUROHRIPLJUDQWHQWUHSUHQHXUVLQFUHDWLQJHPSOR\PHQW
In the 1990s and early 2000s, most migrant entrepreneurs settled in 
Johannesburg or Cape Town.88 These two cities continue to be the major 
sites of informal migrant enterprise. However, one of the distinctive spatial 
features of migrant entrepreneurship is its diffusion throughout the country 
and down the urban hierarchy to many intermediate and smaller cities. A 
growing number of recent studies attest to the increase in business activity 
of migrant entrepreneurs in other South African urban centres.89 This is a 
response to the fact that the policing of informality and immigration is more 
relaxed in smaller centres, as well as being a search for new markets. 
According to census data, rates of unemployment amongst migrants 
in South Africa are generally lower than amongst South Africans, varying 
from a low of 6% in the case of Indian migrants to a high of 30% in the case 
of migrants from Lesotho. Only 18% of Zimbabwean and 24% of Mozam-
bican migrants were unemployed in 2011 (Table 3). Many of those formally 
recorded as unemployed are, in fact, working in the informal economy.90 
A 2010 SAMP survey of post-2005 Zimbabwean migrants in Johannesburg 
and Cape Town, for example, found that 20% were involved in the infor-
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mal economy.91 Studies of other migrant groups such as Somalis suggest 
even higher rates of informal economy participation.92 Asylum seekers and 
refugees from various countries are largely excluded from the formal labour 
market and show high levels of enterprise and innovation in the informal 
economy.93 
The Bureau of Market Research estimated that 80% of 4,584 informal 
traders in inner-city Johannesburg in 2004 were non-South Africans, with 
30% Nigerians, 30% Ethiopians and Somalis and 20% a mixture of Rwan-
dans, Congolese and Zimbabweans.94 A recent analysis of the 2012 South 
African Quarterly Labour Force Survey (Q3) showed clear differences 
between South Africans and international migrants.95 For example, 21% of 
international migrants were classified as self-employed compared with 7% 
of internal migrants and 9% of non-migrants. However, only 13% of the 
total number of self-employed were international migrants compared with 
15% of internal migrants and 71% of non-migrants. These differences were 
amplified in data by sector. As many as 33% of international migrants were 
in the informal sector, compared with 11% of internal migrants and 16% of 
non-migrants. Again, the absolute number of international migrants was 
much smaller, at 12% of the total compared with 14% of internal migrants 
and 74% of non-migrants. There is also evidence of a growing diversifica-
tion of migrant source countries. Most migrants are still from neighbouring 
countries but there are growing numbers from many other African countries 
as well as farther afield, including Bangladesh, Pakistan and China.96 
Migrants are often more entrepreneurial than most, yet the constraints 
they face in establishing and growing their businesses are considerable. 
Their general contribution to employment creation and inclusive growth 
is undervalued and often misrepresented as a threat. Foreign migrants in 
the South African informal economy do have considerable entrepreneurial 
ambition but are severely hampered in growing their enterprises by a range 
of obstacles.97 These have not been systematically researched but include:
 1DWLRQDO LPPLJUDWLRQDQGUHIXJHHSROLFLHVZKLFKGHWHUPLQH WKH WHUPV
and conditions of entry and the ability to move along migration corridors 
between countries; 
 'RFXPHQWDWLRQZKLFKGHWHUPLQHVWKHGHJUHHRIDFFHVVWRVRFLDOILQDQ-
cial and support services; 
 ,PPLJUDWLRQODZHQIRUFHPHQWZLWKWKHHYHUSUHVHQWWKUHDWRIDUUHVWDQG
deportation disrupting business activity; 
 /DFN RI DFFHVV WR FUHGLW UHIXJHHV DQG DV\OXP VHHNHUV DUH FRPPRQO\
refused bank accounts and loans);
 0XQLFLSDO UHJXODWLRQV ZKLFK DUH JHQHUDOO\ XQIULHQGO\ WR WKH LQIRUPDO
sector; and 
 +RVWLOHDQG[HQRSKRELFORFDODWWLWXGHV98 
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Violent attacks on the persons and properties of migrant business 
operations – whether motivated by rivalry, criminality or xenophobia or a 
combination of these – are regular and frequent and involve considerable 
loss of life. The nature and challenges posed by violence against migrant 
entrepreneurs are considered in detail in two companion SAMP reports.99
In terms of economic challenges confronting informal-sector entrepre-
neurs, both South African and migrant, a major issue is the lack of access 
to financial services including start-up capital and ongoing credit. Formal 
financial institutions are extremely reluctant to do business with migrant 
informal entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs “have limited access to debt 
finance from commercial banks as they have problems in opening bank 
accounts, and acquiring visas and permits. In addition, most…have never 
applied for credit, despite the need for credit and may thus be classified as 
discouraged borrowers.”100 Fatoki’s study of 148 migrant entrepreneurs in 
inner-city Johannesburg found that 29% had applied for credit and another 
43% who were in need of credit had not. Of those who applied, only a 
third were successful.101 Tengeh’s study of 135 migrant entrepreneurs in 
Cape Town found that only 10% had obtained a bank loan to start their 
businesses.102 Khosa’s recent study of 93 Cape Town entrepreneurs from 19 
African countries found that only 9% had acquired a bank loan as start-up 
capital compared with 37% who had used personal funds and 36% who 
had relied on family and friends.103 As a result of the lack of credit, many 
migrant entrepreneurs rely on various financial bootstrapping alternatives to 
minimize their capital outlay and running costs (Table 6). 
Despite these financial challenges, there is evidence of upward mobility 
of migrant-owned businesses in terms of the growth of business capital. In 
one study, the majority of African immigrant entrepreneurs in Cape Town 
(71%) had initial start-up business capital in the ZAR1,000 to ZAR5,000 
range. After three or more years of operation the financial capital of nearly 
40% had grown to an estimated range of ZAR50,000 to ZAR100,000.105 
This was a notable achievement in an environment where the rate of new-
business failure is estimated at between 70% and 80%.106 Immigrant entre-
preneurs in South Africa, for instance, have long working hours, resulting 
in increased gross earnings.107 Through risk-taking and heavy investment 
in their businesses, some entrepreneurs have been able to increase the size 
of their operations and have even managed to turn them into formal busi-
nesses.108 Many use mobile phones and other technology that allows for 
increased interaction with suppliers and customers while reducing the need 
to travel.109 Some also make use of social media, for instance, advertising 
their services on Facebook. However, a large number still lack access to 
computers, and records continue to be kept manually.110 It has been sug-
gested that the success of some immigrant-owned businesses in South Africa 
is largely due to immigrant entrepreneurs’ superior qualifications. One study 
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in Cape Town, for example, showed that at least 30% had completed tertiary 
education.111 Empirically, it has been demonstrated that learning contrib-
utes to higher levels of earnings by providing a solid basis for the develop-
ment of an entrepreneurial culture.112
Table 6: Financial Bootstrapping by Migrant Entrepreneurs in Inner-City Johannesburg 
No. %
Share premises with others 141 95
Delay owner’s/manager’s salary 136 92
Obtain loans from family and friends 123 83
Employ relatives and/or friends at non-market salary 115 78
Seek out best conditions possible with suppliers 113 76
Buy on consignment from suppliers 108 73
Contribute capital via other projects that pay the owner 101 68
Offer customers discounts for cash payments 86 58
Get payments in advance from customers 80 54
Use manager’s private credit card for business expenses 77 52
Buy used rather than new equipment 77 52
Deliberately delay payments to suppliers 76 51
Deliberately choose customers who pay quickly 73 49
End a business relationship with a frequently-late-paying customer 72 48
Use different routines for minimizing capital invested in stock 65 44
Use routines to speed up invoicing 62 42
Coordinate purchases with other businesses (for better agreements) 61 41
Borrow equipment or machinery from other businesses 56 38
Hire staff for short periods instead of employing permanently 56 38
Share equipment with other businesses 37 25
Give the same terms of payment to all customers 16 11
Source: Fatoki104
Proponents of the idea of “brain waste” argue that the educational 
qualifications of migrants are devalued and wasted if they cannot obtain 
suitable employment in the formal economy. This may well be the case 
when migrants are unable to obtain jobs that are commensurate with their 
levels of education and training. However, the brain-waste thesis also sug-
gests that working in the informal economy is the ultimate form of wast-
age, “where educated immigrants find employment in the informal sector, 
which is typically characterised by low worker productivity, poor working 
conditions, low or non-existent worker protection and uncertain job pros-
pects.”113 While this is not necessarily incorrect regarding employment 
in the informal economy, it ignores the fact that many educated migrant 
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entrepreneurs are business owners employing others. Formal qualifications 
and experience might not have prepared them for running an informal busi-
ness but these are not necessarily wasted if used to make a success of a new 
enterprise. 
A central premise of the hostility towards foreign migrants in South Afri-
ca is that they “steal” jobs from South Africans. However, a study in Johan-
nesburg in the late 1990s suggested that migrant-owned businesses actually 
created jobs for South Africans through direct hire.114 This finding has been 
widely cited and generalized but was based on a small sample in a localized 
area of the city so its representativeness is unknown. Subsequent case study 
research has consistently corroborated that migrant entrepreneurs generate 
employment for other migrants and for South Africans.115 Tengeh’s study 
of 135 migrant entrepreneurs from Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal 
and Somalia in Cape Town, for example, found that 70 (52%) had paid 
employees. Of these, 48% employed South Africans and 52% employed 
family members or members of the same ethnic group.116 As many as 70% 
agreed or strongly agreed that when they started their businesses, most of 
their employees were South Africans. However, as their businesses grew, 
they tended to employ more people from their home country.117
Kalitanyi’s study of 120 migrant entrepreneurs from Somalia, Nigeria 
and Senegal, also in Cape Town, found that 82% employed South Africans, 
4% employed non-South Africans and 14% employed both.118 Although 
the majority in all three groups preferred to hire South Africans, the pref-
erence was strongest amongst Senegalese and weakest amongst Nigerians. 
Seventy-four percent of the entrepreneurs said that they had transferred 
skills to South Africans in the process of employing them. More research is 
needed, however, on why migrant entrepreneurs employ South Africans and 
under what conditions. The essence of an inclusive growth perspective on 
informality is that the sector should create “decent jobs”. Whether or not 
the jobs created deserve this label has yet to be established. 
A different picture emerges in Radipere’s comparative study of 220 South 
African-owned and 214 migrant-owned SMMEs in Tshwane and Johannes-
burg.119 Two-thirds of the South African enterprises employed other South 
Africans and only 5% employed non-South Africans (Table 7). Nearly 30% 
employed both. Only 12% of the migrant-owned enterprises employed only 
South Africans while 40% employed only other migrants. The largest num-
ber, almost half, employed South Africans and non-South Africans. Since 
the three studies all tended to focus on similar sectors, it is possible that the 
employment practices vary between Gauteng and Cape Town.
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Table 7: Employment Creation by Informal Entrepreneurs, Tshwane and Johannesburg 
South African-owned (%) Foreign-owned (%)
South African employees 64.8 11.8
Foreign employees 4.7 39.6
South African and foreign employees 28.6 48.1
Other employees 1.9 0.5
N 220 214
Source: Radipere120
 
informal Cross-border tradinG
Since the end of apartheid, South Africa has emerged as a market and source of goods for small-scale entrepreneurs whose short-term tempo-
rary visits are often conducted under the legal umbrella of visiting or tour-
ism.121 When it comes to relations between South Africa, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, most of this business is conducted by individuals travelling over-
land and engaged in so-called ICBT (informal cross-border trade). ICBT is 
a major catalyst for involvement in informal economies globally.122 Trading 
across borders plays a vital, though largely unrecognized, role in regional 
economic integration and in linking informal economies in different SADC 
cities. This requires a perspective on informality that takes into account the 
impacts of interaction between different urban informal spaces across the 
region.123 The volume of cross-border trade has been monitored at border 
control points in previous studies and there is a need to update and com-
pare the current situation with that in the past and assess whether changes 
in the immigration regimes of the region, and the growth of informality 
in cities, have impacted on the volume of trade and the types of goods 
being transported.124 More than that, informal traders need to be seen as 
entrepreneurs per se and their activities as a potentially strong promoter 
of inclusive growth and employment creation across the region. There has 
certainly been a tendency in the past to view informal traders as sole opera-
tors rather than micro-enterprises with the potential to grow significantly, 
to create jobs and to generate the capital to branch out into other sectors of 
the informal and formal economy.
In Mozambique and Zimbabwe, a sizeable number of informal entrepre-
neurs are international migrants. They establish their businesses in their 
home cities such as Harare and Maputo and grow them by taking advan-
tage of the opportunities provided by cross-border economic linkages and 
migration. Informal cross-border traders, many of them women, thus play 
a critical role in the circulation of formally and informally produced goods 
throughout the SADC region.125 The African Development Bank estimates 
that informal cross-border trade constitutes between 30% and 40% of total 
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intra-SADC trade with an average annual value of USD17.6 billion.126 
There have been some efforts to monitor the overall volume of trade in 
foodstuffs, most notably by FEWSNET.127 There are marked annual fluc-
tuations in informal flows of maize, rice and beans depending on domestic 
harvests and market opportunities (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Intra-SADC Informal Cross-Border Trade in Food Staples, 2005-2012
Source: FEWSNET128
A SAMP border-monitoring survey of 85,000 traders found that some 
crossed borders to buy goods for sale in their home countries (53% of the 
total), some took goods to sell in another country (32%) and some bought 
and sold in countries of origin and destination as “two-way” traders (13%) 
(Table 8).129 The relative importance of these three trading types varied 
from country to country. In the case of Mozambique, the vast majority of 
traders go to buy goods, mainly in South Africa, for sale at home (81%) and 
very few (1%) take goods from Mozambique to sell. By contrast, only 27% 
of traders from Zimbabwe go to buy goods to bring home and 21% take 
goods from Zimbabwe to sell. Two-way trading is the most important form 
of activity in Zimbabwe (with 48% compared to only 12% of Mozambican 
traders). The survey also examined the types of goods being carried across 
borders. A wide variety of goods was being brought back to sell in the home 
country although, again, there was considerable inter-country variation 
(Table 9). Food items (processed and fresh) were clearly the most important 
but there was also considerable trade in new and second-hand clothing and 
household goods. The differences between Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
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were, however, relatively slight with similar proportions of traders carrying 
groceries and clothing. The only significant difference was with fresh pro-
duce, which was more likely to be carried to Mozambique than Zimbabwe. 
Table 8: Type of Cross-Border Trading Activity (%)
Country of survey
One-way traders
Two-way traders OtherBringing back 
goods to sell
Taking goods  
to sell
Botswana 25 66 7 2
Lesotho 81 19 0 0
Malawi 60 37 3 0
Mozambique 81 1 12 6
Namibia 54 44 1 0
Swaziland 88 8 1 2
Zambia 58 37 5 1
Zimbabwe 27 21 48 4
Total 53 32 13 2
Source: SAMP130
Table 9: Types of Goods Carried by Cross-Border Traders for Sale in Home Country (%)
Country of 
destination 
Groceries
Fresh 
fruit & 
vegeta-
bles
Meat/ 
fish/ 
eggs
Electrical 
goods Furniture
House-
hold 
goods
Clothing/
shoes
Handi-
crafts/
curios
Other
Botswana 8 27 1 1 1 16 19 10 21
Lesotho 10 31 1 - - 6 17 10 24
Malawi 18 7 0 20 1 23 38 0 24
Mozambique 70 21 61 6 1 4 13 - 9
Namibia 56 16 6 3 1 8 3 2 19
Swaziland 4 7 0 3 1 19 65 1 10
Zambia 29 14 8 4 1 8 38 3 16
Zimbabwe 69 2 1 8 1 3 12 0 3
Source: SAMP131
A survey of 120 cross-border traders in Johannesburg (just over a quar-
ter of whom were from Mozambique and Zimbabwe) reached interesting 
findings about trading frequency and the financial spend of traders buying 
goods in South Africa for resale.132 Seventy-two percent of the respondents 
were buying in South Africa for resale in their home countries and 26% had 
brought goods to sell in South Africa. The spend per trip was very significant, 
and certainly belies the image of impoverished survivalists often attached to 
cross-border traders. Nearly half spent more than ZAR10,000 per trip and 
two-thirds spent more than ZAR6,000 per trip (Figure 10). However, this 
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does not capture the total spend since the vast majority enter South Africa 
more than once during the course of the average year. Over 90% made trips 
to South Africa three or more times per year (Figure 11). The survey also 
provided preliminary evidence about the challenges experienced by cross-
border traders, most of which were non-economic (Table 10). For example, 
40% mentioned crime and theft as a problem, 24% mentioned xenophobic 
discrimination and 22% police harassment. 
Figure 10: Money Spent in South Africa Per Visit by Cross-Border Traders
Source: SPB133 
Figure 11: Number of Trips to South Africa Per Year by Cross-Border Traders
Source: SPB134
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Table 10: Problems Faced by Cross-Border Traders in Johannesburg
Problem % of respondents
Crime/theft 39
Cost/location/condition of accommodation 29
Discrimination/harassment due to xenophobia 24
Harassment by police 23
Visa, passport and trading licence application problems/time consumed 22
High rent of stalls 15
Transport problems 11
Tax and tax refund problems 10
Length of visa too short 8
Expensive items 8
Bad service from other stores and general public 6
Too few designated selling points 6
Border and customs control difficulties 5
Import duty procedures 3
Difficulties with securing work permits 3
Communication/language problems 3
Source: SPB135
 
In Harare, and other Zimbabwean cities, case-study research has been 
done on the profiles, activities, opportunities and obstacles that confront 
informal cross-border traders.136 The literature on cross-border trading and 
the informal economy in Maputo is far more limited.137 The primary focus of 
the Zimbabwean literature has been on informal cross-border trade as a sur-
vival and poverty alleviation strategy for women and their households in the 
face of severe economic crisis and unprecedented levels of formal unemploy-
ment. There is little evidence that cross-border trading represents an oppor-
tunity for sustained capital accumulation and business expansion for most. 
One of the reasons is the vulnerability of traders to exploitation and abuse 
during the course of their business activities. Crossing borders is itself a trial 
of demands for sex and bribes, eating into already small profits. Harassment 
en route and in cities of destination has forced traders to adopt strategies to 
protect themselves from criminality and xenophobic hostility.138 
The literature on informal entrepreneurship tends to focus on the indi-
vidual entrepreneur and firm rather than their forms of cooperation. Some 
cross-border traders in Zimbabwe have combined to form traders’ associa-
tions to further their collective interests. For example, the Zimbabwe Cross 
Border Traders Association (ZCBTA) was formed in 2000 with a mandate 
“to promote and defend the interests of its members (and) to enhance the 
capacity of small scale traders/producers to create their own wealth through 
development of viable linkages and advocating for an enabling environ-
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ment for the traders at all levels, i.e. nationally, regionally and globally.”139 
It has just over 7,000 traders organized into trade committees and chapters 
across the country. ZCBTA and other trader organizations still only rep-
resent about 5%-7% of an estimated 300,000 cross-border traders. Their 
combined membership is three-quarters female. A more informal strategy of 
combination is a response to the dangers of travelling alone to South Africa 
to do business. Zimbabwean women travel together, reside with others and 
conduct their business in groups as a form of protection against the depreda-
tions of criminals and the police.140
informal remittinG enterPrise
A related aspect of the relationship between migration and informal entrepreneurship is the massive flow of cash remittances and goods 
that migrants in Johannesburg and Cape Town send to Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, including the cities of Maputo and Harare.141 One study recent-
ly claimed that remittance flows from South Africa to other SADC coun-
tries increased from ZAR6.1 billion in 2006 to ZAR11.2 billion in 2012.142 
Although most migrants in South Africa tend to remit to rural households, 
there is evidence of a flow of remittances to households in both Maputo and 
Harare. The majority of remittances are sent to immediate or extended fam-
ily members for their personal use. As a result, most remittances are spent 
on basic household needs including food, education, health and clothing. 
Only a very small proportion of remittances are saved or invested in produc-
tive enterprise. At the same time, the expenditure of remittances, especially 
on food and clothing, does benefit retailers in the informal economy of these 
cities. What we do not know is what proportion of remittances are gener-
ated within the informal economy of South Africa cities.
The business opportunities for small-scale entrepreneurs in the remit-
tances industry relate more to the channels through which remittances 
of cash and goods are sent home by migrants. The use of formal remitting 
channels (banks and companies such as Western Union) for remittance 
transfers is very limited in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. SAMP’s 2006 
Migration and Remittances Survey found that the vast majority of cash 
remittances are couriered by hand (personal or friends), by taxi drivers and 
by informal transport operators (Table 11).143 Informal channels were clear-
ly more important in Mozambique at that time, with 87% of migrants utiliz-
ing such channels to send remittances to their home country. Around half of 
Zimbabwean migrants used informal channels with a number preferring to 
use formal channels such as the post office (14.5%) and banks in Zimbabwe 
(23.5%). The subsequent economic collapse in Zimbabwe made it uneco-
nomical for migrants to send money using formal channels. Money that 
was sent using formal channels was converted into Zimbabwean dollars at a 
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rate fixed by the country’s central bank, while the growing “black market” 
kept pace with the country’s rapidly increasing inflation rate. This created 
a market for the entry of informal transport operators called the Omalayisha 
who operated largely from South Africa.144 These informal entrepreneurs 
conducted their business in both directions, moving “cash, people – in good 
health, ill health or as corpses – consumer and material goods to Zimbabwe, 
and migrants to South Africa, a process that led to significant improvements 
in household food security and standards of living.”145 
Table 11: Remittance Channels Used by Mozambican and Zimbabwean Migrants in South Africa 
Remittance channel Mozambique (%) Zimbabwe (%)
Formal
Via post office 0.8 14.5
Spouse’s TEBA account 1.7 1.5
Via bank in home country 0.5 23.5
Bank in South Africa 0.2 1.3
Via TEBA own account 4.2 0.6
Informal
Bring personally 43.0 34.6
Via friend/co-worker 35.9 11.0
Via taxis 3.8 2.8
Bus 4.3 0.1
Other method 5.5 9.8
Don’t know 0.0 0.2
Source: Pendleton et al.146
The remitting behaviour of informal sector mobile businesses and indi-
viduals is largely unknown, as is the role of remittances in building informal 
entrepreneurship in Harare and Maputo. Other key unanswered questions 
include: (a) how are the financial benefits of informal entrepreneurship 
distributed between South Africa (local spend), and Zimbabwe and Mozam-
bique (remittances)? (b) do demands for remittances by households for liv-
ing expenses in Zimbabwe and Mozambique reduce the inclination to grow 
and reinvest in South Africa? (c) could informal income in South Africa be 
used to provide start-up capital for enterprises in Harare and Maputo? and 
(d) how does informal remitting (which dominates the remitting behaviour 
of migrants in general) compare with formal remitting in terms of costs and 
benefits to informal economy entrepreneurs and micro-enterprises? 
In the cases of Harare and Maputo, migrant entrepreneurs are primarily 
citizens who use temporary migration to South Africa as a strategy to sup-
port their businesses in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. There are compara-
tively few foreign migrant entrepreneurs in these two cities. In South Africa, 
Informal mIgrant EntrEprEnEurshIp and InclusIvE growth
 36
on the other hand, most migrant entrepreneurs are not citizens at all but 
come from other African countries. The key question, then, is whether and 
to what extent citizenship and its entitlements impact upon opportunities 
and strategies for growing an informal enterprise. A third possibility, about 
which little is known, is whether informal entrepreneurs operate businesses 
that straddle two or more cities. Given the high levels of mobility between 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe and South Africa this does seem likely. Particu-
lar attention needs to be given to straddling as a migrant business strategy. 
Gender, mobility and entrePreneurshiP
Gender issues are of particular relevance to understanding the nature of informal enterprise in Southern African cities. Firstly, cross-border 
migration has always been highly gendered in Southern Africa. For decades, 
migration to South Africa from the rest of Africa was primarily the preserve 
of young men. As recently as 2006, the overall gender breakdown of SADC 
migrants was 86% male and 14% female.147 However, a process of feminiza-
tion of migration is under way with the numbers and proportion of female 
migrants to South Africa increasing rapidly.148 This process has proceeded 
furthest in the case of Zimbabwe, where in 2006 as many as 44% of migrants 
were women. Many migrant women are either spouses of male migrants 
or heads of households. One reason for the feminization of migration is 
changing gender roles within countries of origin especially where traditional 
employers of male migrants, such as the South African mining industry, 
have gone into decline. This has forced more women into cross-border 
migration to South Africa where they can access low-wage employment.
Second, migrant women experience severe discrimination in urban 
labour markets. Formal sector employment is difficult to obtain, even for 
those with skills and education. Few economic sectors prefer to hire women 
over men – domestic service is one, commercial agriculture another. Work-
ing conditions in both are poor with few rights and high levels of exploita-
tion. Unable to obtain work permits, many women are hired as irregular 
migrants, which heightens their vulnerability as they are deprived of legal 
recourse when wages are unpaid or they are abused in the workplace. The 
majority cannot obtain formal sector jobs at all and are forced into survival-
ist activities in the urban informal economy. The informal economy, particu-
larly street trading, is dominated by women as a result.149
Third, in both Harare and Maputo, gender is a particularly significant 
axis of differentiation and opportunity within the informal economy. In the 
Harare of the 1990s, the majority of informal operations were owned and 
run by women.150 The collapse of the formal economy pushed many more 
men into the sector and made the highly competitive informal business 
environment a site of new conflict.151 Similar gender-based tussles have 
emerged within the informal economy of Maputo.152 Cross-border trade 
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between Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa was initially dominated 
by women who were precluded from formal sector labour markets and used 
the proceeds to sustain their households, independent of male household 
heads.153 In the last decade, higher rates of unemployment amongst men 
have prompted them to move into the trade, leading to growing gender 
conflict over control of sectors of the trade as well as the disposition of the 
proceeds of trade.
Fourth, migrant women face considerable challenges to entrepreneurship 
and building successful enterprises.154 Some are internal and others exter-
nal to the household. Patriarchal domination in the household is often an 
obstacle to innovation, independent activity and control over the proceeds 
of work. In addition, domestic responsibilities and entrenched gender roles 
deprive women of the time, resources and energy to devote to revenue-
generating economic activity. Outside the household, women face exclusion 
as migrants and from the resources needed to grow an informal business 
successfully. On the other hand, migration can provide opportunity, freeing 
women from the constraints of patriarchy and facilitating empowerment 
through independent economic activity outside the direct control of male 
household members.155
Finally, supposedly gender-neutral migration policies have been shown 
to contain discriminatory provisions that penalize, and often criminalize, 
the mobility and livelihood strategies of marginalized migrant women. This 
has been particularly evident in the formulation and implementation of 
national immigration policy.156 At the local level, municipal regulations and 
policing of the informal economy impact most directly and negatively on 
female entrepreneurs and traders who dominate this activity.157 What is less 
clear is how municipal policies towards informal entrepreneurship enable or 
constrain the ability of women to grow their businesses and contribute to 
gender-sensitive inclusive growth. Women also face other non-economic 
obstacles in the form of parasitical male police and customs officials who 
control the corridors of movement.158
These gender-based issues can be reformulated as a set of key research 
questions: (a) does the feminization of migration impact on the nature of 
participation of women in the informal economy, are there gender differ-
ences in the types and opportunities for involvement of men and women 
in informal entrepreneurship and does small business development offer 
women (and especially women-headed households) a way out of urban pov-
erty? (b) what kinds of gender-based challenges affect migrant female and 
not male entrepreneurs and what strategies do they adopt to establish and 
grow their businesses? (c) how do intra-household gender roles and expec-
tations impact on the ability of women to establish and grow their informal 
enterprises? and (d) are national and local policies on migration and the 
informal economy disadvantageous to female entrepreneurs and what kinds 
of policy reforms would mitigate this situation?
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miGrant entrePreneurial motivation
Researchers in other parts of the world have increasingly sought to docu-ment and understand the diverse motivations for informal entrepre-
neurship.159 A common, if simplistic, distinction is often made between sur-
vivalist or marginalist or involuntary participants in the informal economy 
and those who choose informal over formal work because of the opportuni-
ties it provides. These two groups are often referred to as necessity-driven 
and opportunity-driven entrepreneurs.160 The former have been described 
as follows: “their contribution is negligible and expected returns are low 
and intermittent, moreover they display low expectations of growth and job 
creation, and their motivation is all about personal survival.”161 In South-
ern Africa, until recently, attention tended to focus more on the survivalist 
activities and income-generating strategies of those in the informal econo-
my. The underlying premise was that individuals in the informal sector were 
struggling to earn a living in conditions of extreme difficulty and margin-
alization. However, the “marginalization thesis” has been tested and found 
wanting in other contexts in Africa and there is no reason why it should be 
uncritically applied to South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.162 
Participation in the informal economy may be enforced, in the sense 
that there are no alternatives, but that does not mean that all participants 
are therefore just “getting by” until a better opportunity presents itself in 
the formal economy. One psychological study of “necessity entrepreneurs” 
in Johannesburg, for example, found that they displayed “cognitive styles 
matching enterprising attitudes.”163 There is also considerable variability 
amongst so-called survivalists. A three-year study of street traders in inner-
city Johannesburg, for example, found considerable variation in levels of 
satisfaction and a very strong statistical relationship between “continuance 
satisfaction” and levels of income.164 The same research also found consid-
erable variation in the psychological value systems of individual traders.165 
One of the most vexing questions for small business advocates in South 
Africa is what is commonly seen as an underdeveloped entrepreneurial 
motivation or “spirit” amongst those living in more disadvantaged areas 
of the country.166 Some studies have contested this stereotype while oth-
ers have sought explanations that are lodged in the repressive legacy of 
apartheid and the dysfunctional South African education system.167 The 
issue has been brought into sharp relief by South Africa’s poor ranking in 
global entrepreneurship surveys and the relatively small size of the informal 
economy.168 The perception that migrants are far more successful entrepre-
neurs than South Africans in the informal economy has prompted a new 
research focus on migrant entrepreneurial orientation and motivation and, 
by extension, comparisons with South African entrepreneurs.169 One study 
of 500 SMMEs in the retail sector in Gauteng, however, found no significant 
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difference between South Africans and migrants in terms of their motiva-
tion to start a business.170 Another study of the entrepreneurial orientation 
of 339 South African (44%) and non-South African (56%) street traders 
in inner-city Johannesburg found, to the obvious surprise of the authors, 
that South Africans were more innovative than international migrants 
(with migrants to Johannesburg from other parts of South Africa the most 
innovative of all).171 However, South Africans were associated with lower 
levels of the entrepreneurial qualities of “proactiveness” and “competitive 
aggression” and, overall, South African nationality was “negatively and 
significantly associated with total entrepreneurial orientation.”172 Competi-
tive aggressiveness was also positively correlated with years spent in the city, 
days worked per week, and degree of training.173 A third study focused on 
the spaza shop sector in Khayelitsha, Cape Town.174 Of a total of 352 spaza 
owners interviewed, 214 (61%) were South Africans and 138 (39%) were 
international migrants. In both groups, the gender split was around 60% 
male and 40% female. Migrants scored better than South Africans on four 
separate indicators of entrepreneurial orientation: achievement, innova-
tion, personal initiative and autonomy.
Other aspects of migrant entrepreneurial motivation have been exam-
ined in other case studies based on research in inner-city Johannesburg. 
Fatoki, for example, analysed the “competitive intelligence” of migrant-
owned businesses in Johannesburg and found that competition informa-
tion-seeking is performed by the majority of owners and their employees, 
especially to monitor the prices of their competitors.175 This enables them 
to undercut their competition and attract more customers. The study also 
examined the growth expectations of migrant entrepreneurs and found a 
high degree of optimism.176 Education, managerial experience, related expe-
rience, motivation and networking were all significant predictors of positive 
growth expectations. At the firm level, innovation and adequate access to 
finance were significant predictors of growth expectations.
PatholoGiZinG sPaCe, PoliCinG informality
The three countries (and four municipalities) discussed in this paper represent contrasting policy responses to the informal economy and 
informal migrant entrepreneurship. The predominant attitude towards the 
informal economy in Zimbabwe and Harare over the last decade has been 
extremely negative and repressive underwritten by a modernist view of city 
planning and the pathologizing of informal urban space, which are totally at 
odds with the reality of survival in a rapidly shrinking formal economy and 
mass unemployment.177 These views culminated in the nationwide assault 
on informality by the Mugabe government through Operation Muram-
batsvina (Clean Out the Trash) in 2005, which attempted to destroy all 
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manifestations of urban informality: businesses, markets and shelter.178 The 
UN Habitat mission to Zimbabwe estimated that some 700,000 people in 
cities across the country lost either their homes, their source of livelihood 
or both.179 Sites where informal economy workers gathered to market their 
wares, as well as formal markets, some of which had been in operation for 
decades, were targeted. An estimated 75,000 vendors in Harare alone were 
unable to work from late May, 2005.180 The informal economy in cities like 
Harare was, in fact, a consequence of government policies and, in particular, 
the country’s growing economic crisis.181 With the collapse of the manu-
facturing base and commercial food production, the shelves in formal retail 
outlets emptied, providing new opportunities for informal entrepreneurship. 
Many moved to South Africa and countries overseas to procure goods un-
available locally for resale and opened up new markets for products made in 
Zimbabwe, particularly in the handicraft industry.
Operation Murambatsvina temporarily devastated the informal economy 
and the livelihoods of the urban poor in many Zimbabwean cities.182 How-
ever, this reactionary and retrograde policy appears to have been no more 
than a temporary “fix” for its architects as informality quickly rebounded 
and returned to the urban spaces from which it had been erased.183 The key 
policy question in Zimbabwe is what the impact of the official harassment 
has been on informal entrepreneurship and how informal entrepreneurs 
have responded to this policy through strategies of avoidance, resistance 
and flight. If Zimbabwe’s economic recovery gathers pace, it is important to 
know whether the state will adopt a more tolerant approach to informality 
or whether the vast informal economy will continue to “fly under the radar” 
and be the target of renewed repression.
In Mozambique, and Maputo in particular, the national and municipal 
authorities have traditionally adopted a tolerant approach to the informal 
economy, primarily because it provides a livelihood to so many and because 
of the social unrest likely to be generated by a Zimbabwe-style assault.184 
Maputo has experienced food and fuel riots in recent years and any activ-
ity that lowers the cost of food is unlikely to be tampered with. While the 
informal economy has been subject to periodic harassment, it is generally 
viewed within official circles as an important and sustainable source of live-
lihood for the urban poor. However, as one study points out, the state is “not 
universally tolerant of informal activities” and has “embraced a moderniz-
ing agenda, aimed at promoting formalization.”185 The policy aim is not to 
eliminate informality but to “discourage” illegality through registration and 
formalization. One mechanism has been the establishment of formal urban 
markets where vendors pay rent for stands. However, many of these stands 
remain unoccupied. As one commentator noted: “What they say in Maputo 
is that there are thousands of spaces available in the legal official municipal 
markets which are not being taken up. People don’t do this because if they 
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move into the markets they will have to pay taxes. All these people would 
prefer to sell their stuff on the pavements.”186
In 2008, a simplified tax for small businesses was introduced, payable as 
a percentage of turnover or as a lump sum. Any company, individual trader 
or producer with a volume of business less than about USD100,000 per year 
could opt for this tax instead of paying income, corporation and value-added 
taxes. However, uptake has been low.187 To date, informal entrepreneurs 
have been largely resistant to such efforts, which are viewed as a “money 
grab by the state.”188 The vast majority (80%) of firms in a 2005 survey had 
no kind of documentation and were officially illegal.189 According to Byiers, 
“it is important to understand why greater formalization might be desirable. 
While the government tends to focus on raising revenues, where micro 
informal firms are concerned, the benefit from formalization is more likely 
to be the secondary effects of allowing enterprises to operate legitimately, 
and thus potentially raising their productivity and ability to integrate more 
deeply with the national economy.”190 
There is some evidence that former informal operators who have regis-
tered and paid licences and taxes are more productive than those who spend 
a great deal of effort evading the authorities, but the obstacles to formaliza-
tion and why this might be avoided or resisted need further research, as do 
the implications of formalization. Mozambique now has one of the fastest 
growing formal economies in Africa and the streetscape of major cities such 
as Maputo is being transformed. Policy pressures to formalize the informal 
economy, a basic precept of the many international agencies and donors 
that advise and provide resources for urban infrastructure, are likely to 
intensify. Already one of Maputo’s major informal markets, Xikhelene, has 
been “upgraded”, which has forced vendors to rent new stands and elimi-
nated all associated trading on the streets around the market.191
The South African response to informality lies somewhere between the 
Mozambican and Zimbabwean, but has been neither consistent nor coher-
ent. Given the vigorous suppression of informality by the apartheid state, 
it was likely that the country’s first democratic state would reinforce the 
new policies of tolerance that emerged in the late 1980s. At the national 
level, the post-apartheid state introduced a set of support programmes to 
assist entrepreneurship development and upgrading of the small, medium 
and microenterprise (SMME) economy. Rogerson’s review of the impacts 
of the first 10 years of the post-apartheid government’s SMME programmes 
concluded, however, that “existing government SMME programmes largely 
have been biased towards the groups of small and medium-sized enterprises 
and to a large extent have by-passed micro-enterprises and the informal 
economy.”192 A detailed review of the efficacy of the South African govern-
ment support measures to the informal economy during the post-apartheid 
period concluded that they were “few and far between, patchy and inco-
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herent, and largely ineffective.”193 Another study demonstrates this has 
particularly been true for female entrepreneurs.194 
Although these evaluations need to be updated, there are indications 
that very small economic players in the informal economy “continue to 
fall through the gaps in government policy.”195 Two recent initiatives from 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) illustrate the kinds of anti-
foreign thinking that inform the national government’s policy response. In 
mid-March 2013, the DTI launched the National Informal Business Uplift-
ment Strategy (NIBUS), the first nationally-coordinated policy approach 
to dealing with the informal sector, which has led to the establishment of 
the Shared Economic Infrastructure Facility (SEIF) and the Informal Busi-
ness Upliftment Facility (IBUF) tackling infrastructure and skills deficits 
respectively. SEIF provides funding for new, upgrades or maintenance of 
infrastructure that is shared by informal businesses. Funding is available 
to municipalities on a 50:50 cost-sharing grant basis to a maximum of 
ZAR2 million. IBUF focuses on skills development, promotional material, 
product improvement, technology support, equipment, and help with regis-
tration. This is being piloted through the training of 1,000 informal traders 
in a partnership with the Wholesale and Retail Sector Education and Train-
ing Authority. The stated target of business upliftment is entrepreneurial 
activity in the informal economy. This, combined with an emphasis on 
graduation to the formal economy, runs the risk of “picking the winners” 
and neglecting the majority. Policy at both national and local level needs 
to recognize the diverse nature of informal activity and the fact that these 
activities require support that is quite specific.
The final NIBUS document has yet to be released by the DTI. However, 
the first two drafts express clear anti-foreign sentiment. The March 2013 
draft, for example, states that “there are no regulatory restrictions in con-
trolling the influx of foreigners, especially Chinese and Pakistanians; and it 
seems there is no synergy between the DTI and Home Affairs in devising 
strategies and policies to control foreign business activities.” The January 
2014 draft adds that “this strategic pillar further attends to foreign trader 
challenge as there is evidence of violence and unhappiness of local com-
munities with regard to the takeover of local business by foreign nationals. 
A number of foreign traders are also illegal in the country and some are 
involved in the sale of illegal goods.” 
The second development is the tabling in Parliament of the Licensing 
of Businesses Bill in 2013 by the DTI. The Bill specifies that any person 
involved in business activities – no matter how small – will be required to 
have a licence. Members of the South African Police Service, traffic officers 
and peace officers, amongst others, would be given powers to enforce com-
pliance – to conduct inspections, question any person, remove any goods on 
the premises and confiscate them and close any premises pending further 
 Migration Policy SerieS no. 68
 43
investigation. Those found in contravention of the Act, once convicted 
would be liable for a fine of an unspecified amount or imprisonment for up 
to 10 years.196 The Bill is extremely punitive and would result in large-scale 
criminalization of current livelihood activities. It was withdrawn for revision 
after a chorus of protest from the private sector, non-governmental organi-
zations, academics and the media. 
The sections of the Bill referring to migrants are especially relevant. The 
Bill states that licences will be only be given to non-citizens who have first 
acquired a business permit under the Immigration Act or a refugee permit 
under the Refugee Act.197 Business permits have to be applied for in the 
country of origin and are only granted if the applicant can demonstrate 
that he or she has ZAR2.5 million to invest in South Africa. Few, if any, 
cross-border traders and migrant entrepreneurs currently operating in the 
South African informal economy would qualify. The Bill also suggests that 
community-based organizations, non-governmental organizations and others 
will be given the job of working with the licensing authorities to police this. 
The implication here is that South Africans could assist the police in iden-
tifying and “rooting out” foreign traders. The xenophobic attacks of 2008 
demonstrated that there are elements in many communities who need no 
encouragement to turn on their neighbours from other African countries. 
This shows a strong anti-foreign sentiment within national government 
with a focus on those operating in the informal economy. The Deputy Trade 
and Industry Minister, for example, has stated that “the scourge of South 
Africans in townships selling and renting their businesses to foreigners 
unfortunately does not assist us as government in our efforts to support and 
grow these informal businesses…You still find many spaza shops with Afri-
can names, but when you go in to buy you find your Mohammeds and most 
of them are not even registered.”198 Such sentiments are echoed within the 
ruling African National Congress (ANC). The ANC National Executive 
Committee stated just prior to the 2014 national elections that “arising from 
issues raised on our door to door election campaign…it was decided that 
an in-depth research be commissioned to look into the best way of dealing 
with jobs particularly that do not require high level of skills that get taken 
by foreign nationals, equally such an in-depth research should also look 
into small trading impact by foreign nationals. It was agreed that once the 
research has been completed and the report compiled, further discussion 
will be undertaken with a view to refine our immigration policy.”199 
At the local level, in both Cape Town and Johannesburg, there are con-
tradictions between policy statements affirming the positive contribution of 
the informal economy and the actual implementation of policy. Consider, 
for example, a particularly visible element of the informal economy – street 
trading. Johannesburg’s street trading policy states that “informal trading is 
a positive development in the micro business sector as it contributes to the 
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creation of jobs and alleviation of poverty and has the potential to expand 
further the City’s economic base.”200 Cape Town’s policy advocates for 
a “thriving informal trading sector that is valued and integrated into the 
economic life, urban landscape and social activities within the City of Cape 
Town.”201 
Yet, in late 2013, the Johannesburg City Council violently removed and 
confiscated the inventory of an estimated 6,000 inner-city street traders, 
many of them migrants. A group of traders took the city to court and, in 
April 2014, the Constitutional Court ruled in their favour with Acting Chief 
Justice Moseneke stating that the so-called Operation Clean Sweep was an 
act of “humiliation and degradation” and that the attitude of the City “may 
well border on the cynical.”202 Street traders have returned to the streets 
but their future remains uncertain. The City has commissioned a project to 
consider alternatives while simultaneously pursuing the declaration of large 
inner city areas restricted and prohibited trade zones.203 Wafer’s detailed 
analysis shows how the city has long been ambivalent, if not actively hostile, 
to the informal economy.204 Recent research on inner-city Cape Town sug-
gests that there is less draconian but more systemic exclusion exemplified 
by the allocation of only 410 street-trading bays in the whole inner city.205 
There is evidence of ongoing harassment of traders throughout the city.206 
Although the policy environment differs in different parts of the city and 
between different segments within the informal economy, the modern-
ist vision of the “world-class city” with its associated antipathy towards 
informality and the pathologizing of informal space and activity seems to 
predominate. 
Some of the most dedicated, enterprising and successful entrepreneurs in 
the South African informal economy are migrants to the country. Under any 
other circumstances they would probably be lauded by government as exem-
plars of small-scale and micro entrepreneurship. However, the state (and 
many citizens) view their activities as highly undesirable simply because 
of their national origins. Harassment, extortion and bribery of officialdom 
are some of the daily costs of doing business in South Africa. Many entre-
preneurs, especially in informal settlements and townships, face constant 
security threats and enjoy minimal protection from the police.207 Informal 
cross-border traders face another set of obstacles.208 These include harass-
ment by police and border guards, demands for inflated customs duties, 
transportation problems for goods, personal safety and security, unfriendly 
municipal regulations, and the difficulties of accessing credit. As a result 
they are unable to utilize their entrepreneurial skills and experience and 
grow their businesses in optimal fashion.
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ConClusion
In a recent discussion of the relationship between inclusive growth and informality, Heintz defines inclusive growth as growth that occurs in a 
context in which employment opportunities expand and improve, poor 
households’ access to these opportunities increases, and inequalities are 
decreased. He suggests a research agenda focused on four main issues: 
 7KHFDXVDOOLQNDJHVEHWZHHQHFRQRPLFJURZWKHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQW
and informality; 
 7KHEDUULHUVWRHFRQRPLFPRELOLW\IDFHGE\LQGLYLGXDOVDQGHQWHUSULVHVLQ
the informal economy, such as economic risk, transitions into and out of 
informal employment, gender-based constraints, and enterprise upgrad-
ing; 
 /LQNDJHVEHWZHHQWKHIRUPDODQGLQIRUPDO LQVWLWXWLRQVHQWHUSULVHVDQG
employment; and 
 ,QIRUPDOLW\DQGWKHTXDOLW\RILQIRUPDOHPSOR\PHQW
While there are several references to mobility in Heintz’s discussion, 
this is generally confined to economic mobility and not spatial mobility 
and the interactions between the economic and the spatial. For all its rel-
evance, therefore, his proposed agenda overlooks a central characteristic 
and determinant of informality – human mobility and migration – and the 
ways in which it complicates the relationship between inclusive growth and 
informality. 
In an analysis of the relationship between migration and inclusive 
growth in India, IDRC’s Arjan de Haan argues that migration and migrants 
are largely invisible in policy debates.209 He draws a parallel between out-
dated conceptions of the informal economy and migration that see both as 
transitional, noting that “as within the concept of informal sector, so with 
migrants there is a risk that the assumption of transitional existence may 
hinder creative thinking about ways in which migrants can be supported.” 
Arguing that a strong anti-migrant bias pervades policy discussions, de 
Haan states that “policy makers around the world tend to regard migrants as 
vagrants, and perceive migration as a threat to stability, to social order, and/
or to national or regional identity.” In Southern Africa, global debates about 
the positive aspects of the relationship between migration and development 
have made limited headway.210 Instead, migration is viewed by politicians 
and policy-makers alike as something to be resisted and controlled and 
migrants themselves as threats, parasites, job-stealers and law-breakers. The 
creative potential and possibilities of migrant entrepreneurship, whether 
survivalist or opportunistic, are ignored and regulatory barriers are constant-
ly created and reinforced. Ironically, migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa 
from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and other African countries would be lauded 
as economic innovators and exemplars, but for the fact that they carry the 
labels “foreigner” and “outsider.”
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The backdrop for the Growing Informal Cities (GIC) Project’s focus 
on informality and migrant entrepreneurship is regional integration, rapid 
urbanization and the expansion of informal urban economies in the South-
ern African cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg, Maputo and Harare. With 
high rates of formal unemployment in most countries, the informal economy 
has emerged as a major source of income and livelihoods for poor urban 
households. Migrants in and from all four cities play a critical role in the 
informal economy yet the importance of that role is often underestimated 
and invisible to researchers and policy-makers. Migrants may be more entre-
preneurial than most, yet the constraints and obstacles they face in estab-
lishing and growing their businesses are massive. Their general contribution 
to employment creation and inclusive growth is undervalued and often mis-
represented as a threat, they face particular difficulties in accessing micro-
finance and the formal banking system, they are often excluded from SMME 
training programmes and they frequently run afoul of badly-managed and 
often corrupt systems of immigration and border control.
The purpose of the GIC is to examine and profile the “hidden” role of 
migrant informal entrepreneurship in different Southern African cities. The 
cities were chosen for analysis and comparison because they represent dif-
ferent forms of migrant entrepreneurship. In South African cities like Cape 
Town and Johannesburg, migrant entrepreneurs come from throughout 
Africa including Zimbabwe and Mozambique. In Maputo and Harare, most 
migrant entrepreneurs are local but they structure their businesses around 
the opportunities afforded by growing regional integration and cross-border 
migration to and from South Africa. Policies towards informality and 
informal entrepreneurship vary from country to country. In Zimbabwe, the 
informal economy has been ruthlessly repressed but survives nonetheless. In 
Mozambique, there is a laissez-faire attitude towards the informal economy 
and attempts to formalize informal businesses through registration have 
not been particularly successful. In South Africa, informality is generally 
encouraged at the national level through training programmes and support 
activities. But at the municipal level, the informal economy is often viewed 
in negative terms and pathologized. The impacts of national and municipal 
programmes and actions are uncertain especially for migrant entrepreneurs. 
Indeed, these entrepreneurs, who could and do contribute to inclusive 
growth, are subjected to social and economic exclusion that spills over into 
xenophobia.
The GIC is generating a comparative body of knowledge about informal 
migrant entrepreneurs, raising their profile in regional, national and munici-
pal policy debates with a view to effecting positive change in the regulatory 
environment in which they operate. By allowing migrant entrepreneurs to 
expand and reach their full potential, free of harassment and exclusion, a 
major contribution can be made to facilitating inclusive growth through 
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informal entrepreneurship. To this end, GIC will advance understanding 
of the reciprocal links between mobility and informal entrepreneurship in 
Southern African cities through a programme of ongoing rigorous research 
oriented to the economic growth and poverty reduction goals of SADC 
governments, and impacting on policy implementation processes around 
migration, development and urban management. The more specific objec-
tives of GIC are:
 (QKDQFLQJWKHHYLGHQFHEDVHRQWKHOLQNVEHWZHHQPLJUDWLRQDQGLQIRU-
malization in Southern African cities and examining the implications for 
municipal, national and regional immigration and urban development 
policy; 
 $QDO\]LQJ WKH UROH SOD\HG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO PLJUDQWV LQ WKH LQIRUPDO
economy of particular cities (Cape Town and Johannesburg) and the role 
of cross-border migration in the informal economy of others (Harare and 
Maputo) and identifying the obstacles that migrant entrepreneurs face 
in maximizing the growth and employment creation potential of their 
businesses; and 
 'HYHORSLQJD IUDPHZRUN IRU IDFLOLWDWLQJJUHDWHURSSRUWXQLWLHV IRU LQIRU-
mal entrepreneurship amongst migrants, including refugees and female 
entrepreneurs. 
In order to better understand the linkages between migration, informal-
ity and inclusive growth in Cape Town and Johannesburg , GIC is undertak-
ing the following activities:
 $VXUYH\RIDVDPSOHRIPLJUDQWRZQHGPLFURHQWHUSULVHVLQ&DSH
Town and Johannesburg in various sectors of the informal economy. 
Information is being gathered on characteristics of the micro-enterprise 
(including origins, ownership, structure, capitalization) activities (with a 
particular emphasis on mobile marketing strategies), income generation, 
employment creation potential, entrepreneurial orientation and perfor-
mance in the informal economy; 
 ,Q *DXWHQJ D FRPSOHPHQWDU\ VXUYH\ RI  6RXWK$IULFDQRZQHG
enterprises, which will allow for comparative analysis of the make-up and 
business strategies of South African versus migrant-owned enterprises in 
the informal economy;
 4XDOLWDWLYH LQWHUYLHZV DQG IRFXV JURXSV ZLWK  PLJUDQW LQIRUPDO
entrepreneurs to ascertain institutional and other problems faced in 
growing businesses; and
 ,QWHUYLHZVZLWKNH\LQIRUPDQWVLQPXQLFLSDOLWLHVLQFOXGLQJEXVLQHVVDVVR-
ciations and policy-makers on attitudes towards regulation and support 
of migrant entrepreneurs.
The GIC is also focusing on informal cross-border traders who use migra-
tion as a strategy to sustain and grow their businesses. Research includes:
 $ VXUYH\ RI  0R]DPELFDQ DQG =LPEDEZHDQ LQIRUPDO WUDGHUV LQ
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Harare and Maputo for information on participants, economic activities, 
challenges, business strategies and migration behaviour; 
 ,QGHSWKTXDOLWDWLYHLQWHUYLHZVZLWK0R]DPELFDQDQG=LPEDEZHDQ
traders with a focus on migration-related strategies to build and grow 
informal businesses and attitudes towards policy regulation of their 
activities;
 $ FRPSOHPHQWDU\ VXUYH\ RI  FURVVERUGHU WUDGHUV LQ WKH FLW\ RI
Johannesburg; and
 )RFXVJURXSLQWHUYLHZVZLWKQDWLRQDODQGPXQLFLSDORIILFLDOVIRUPDOVHF-
tor businesses, unions and traders’ associations on policy frameworks and 
impacts on migrant entrepreneurship.
Finally, the GIC is examining national and municipal regulatory frame-
works around informality and informal entrepreneurship with a focus on the 
opportunities and obstacles that these frameworks pose to the establishment 
and growth of migrant businesses including: 
 $FRPSDUDWLYHDXGLWRIQDWLRQDODQGPXQLFLSDOSROLFLHVDQGUHJXODWLRQV
that affect informal migrant entrepreneurs in South Africa, Mozambique 
and Zimbabwe;
 $QLQYHQWRU\RIVPDOOHQWHUSULVHSROLFLHVDQGVWUDWHJLHVDQGDVVHVVPHQW
of whether migrants and refugees have access to these programmes; and
 .H\LQIRUPDQWLQWHUYLHZVWRDVFHUWDLQSHUFHLYHGLPSDFWVRIH[LVWLQJSROL-
cies and potential impacts of policies that could be used to grow informal 
migrant businesses. 
The results and policy implications of this programme of research will be 
published in forthcoming reports in this special SAMP series.
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